Mexico's Nuclear Energy Future: Bridging the Gap Between Policy and Implementation

Mexico has long recognized the potential of nuclear power in diversifying its electricity mix, reducing emissions, and ensuring long-term energy security. Yet, despite repeated commitments over the past two decades, the country’s nuclear sector remains stagnant—caught between political hesitancy and overreliance on fossil fuels. While national energy policies frequently name nuclear energy as a strategic priority, actual development has been slow to materialize, with plans consistently delayed or abandoned.

In 2022, Mexico generated 396 TWh of electricity, with nearly 80% of that coming from fossil fuels: natural gas (57%), oil (14%), and coal (7%). Nuclear power accounted for only 3% (10.8 TWh)—a level unchanged for years, despite the operation of the Laguna Verde Nuclear Power Plant since the 1990s. The plant, located in Veracruz, houses two General Electric boiling water reactors (BWRs): Laguna Verde 1 and Laguna Verde 2, both BWR-5 models, with net capacities of 777 MWe and 775 MWe, respectively, totaling 1,552 MWe. In July 2020, Mexico’s energy minister approved a 30-year extension to the operating license of Laguna Verde 1, allowing it to operate until July 2050, while a similar extension for Unit 2 was granted in August 2022, permitting operations until April 2055. Meanwhile, intermittent renewables such as wind and hydro contributed just 5% and 9%, respectively. Clearly, Mexico’s energy portfolio remains carbon-heavy and deeply dependent on imported natural gas, particularly from the United States.

Policy Ambitions vs. Ground Realities

Mexico’s nuclear narrative is filled with lofty targets and optimistic timelines. The 2010 scenarios developed by the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE) ranged from continued coal reliance to an aggressive low-carbon transition powered by nuclear and wind. Under the most ambitious scenario, nuclear energy would contribute nearly 25% of the country's electricity by 2028, with ten new reactors envisioned.

A more modest plan emerged earlier: bring one new unit online by 2015 and add seven more by 2025 to lift nuclear’s share to 12%. Cost assessments supported these ideas—nuclear was found to be competitive with gas at around 4¢/kWh. But cheap natural gas prices and infrastructure inertia stalled momentum. The decision to build was repeatedly postponed.

The 2012 national energy policy reignited interest by calling for at least two additional reactors, either at Laguna Verde or elsewhere in Veracruz. This was echoed again in 2014. Then came a more actionable blueprint in 2015, when the National Electric System Development Programme included a tentative schedule to commission three new nuclear power plants by 2026, 2027, and 2028.

By 2019, plans were refined: build four new reactors—two at Laguna Verde and two on the Pacific coast. In 2022, Mexico’s Secretariat of Energy projected that annual nuclear output could double by 2035. Yet, as of 2025, not a single new unit has broken ground. The numbers remain static, and the gap between policy and practice continues to widen.

Hesitation in the Face of a Strategic Opportunity

Mexico has shown a genuine ambition to expand its nuclear energy capacity—an intent that is clearly reflected in the frequent updates to national energy policy that repeatedly include nuclear in future planning scenarios. This ambition is further evidenced by the Secretariat of Energy’s 2022 projection, which stated that annual nuclear electricity production could double by 2035. The country’s institutional planning recognizes nuclear power as a long-term solution for energy diversification, grid stability, and decarbonization.

However, despite this policy momentum, Mexico’s nuclear programme still awaits a critical ice-break—a firm political and financial commitment to move from paper to project. The vision exists, but the inertia remains. Repeated references to nuclear in strategy documents have yet to result in new construction, regulatory reform, or tangible investment. The lack of execution continues to hold back a sector with clear strategic advantages.

Even with the economic and environmental benefits of nuclear being well-established, Mexico continues to prioritize short-term gains through fossil fuels—particularly imported natural gas, which has been historically cheap but is now exposed to international price volatility and supply constraints. Natural gas may no longer be the bargain it once was, and this overdependence could increasingly undermine energy sovereignty and long-term price stability.

In contrast, nuclear energy offers predictable costs over multi-decade lifespans, shields the economy from external shocks, and strengthens domestic energy security. The question now is whether Mexico can summon the political will to act on its own ambitions—or continue to postpone decisions while energy vulnerabilities grow.

A Call to Act: Realizing the 2019 Nuclear Proposal

If Mexico is serious about meeting its clean energy goals and reducing its fossil fuel dependence, it must stop postponing nuclear development. The 2019 proposal—to construct four new reactors (two at Laguna Verde and two on the Pacific coast)—offers a realistic and urgently needed starting point. These plants would strengthen grid reliability, diversify the energy mix, and align with Mexico’s long-stated ambition of reaching 35% clean electricity by 2024, as outlined in the 2015 Energy Transition Law.

Beyond these large-scale plants, small modular reactors (SMRs) could play a critical role in reaching underserved regions, powering desalination facilities, and supporting industrial hubs. The National Institute for Nuclear Research (ININ) has previously explored the potential for deploying three IRIS SMRs to simultaneously generate 840 MWe and produce 140,000 m³ of potable water per day through reverse osmosis desalination. This type of integration is uniquely suited to Mexico’s water-stressed coastal zones and arid agricultural regions.

From Policy to Project Implementation

Mexico has the policy frameworks, scientific expertise, and energy demand profile to make nuclear a central pillar of its future electricity system. What it lacks is implementation. While policy documents highlight nuclear as a clean, reliable, and competitive option, the country’s actual energy trajectory continues to favor fossil fuel expansion, natural gas infrastructure, and intermittent renewables.

To bridge this credibility gap, Mexico must move beyond repeated policy declarations and take decisive action. Implementing the 2019 nuclear reactor proposal is the first step. Exploring SMR deployment should follow close behind.

The longer Mexico delays, the more difficult it will become to meet its clean energy targets and protect its energy sovereignty. Nuclear energy is not just an option—it is a necessity for any serious decarbonization strategy. The question is no longer whether Mexico can build nuclear capacity—it’s whether it will.