Sahel's Nuclear Gambit
June 2025 marked a watershed moment for the Sahel's energy future and its geopolitical alignment. Within a week, Russia finalized comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreements with Burkina Faso (June 19) and Mali (June 23). These pacts commit Moscow’s state nuclear firm (Rosatom) to help build civilian nuclear programs in two of the world’s least electrified nations (only ~20% of people in Burkina Faso have grid power). On the surface this is an ambitious attempt to close chronic power gaps; in reality it also signals a profound realignment. Under the new Alliance of Sahel States (a 2023 confederation of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), the West African nations are pivoting away from former partners (most notably France) toward Russia. Pursuing nuclear energy becomes both a showcase of modernity and a tool of sovereignty, promising low carbon baseload power that could accelerate industrial growth and social development. For example, Mali’s government explicitly hailed its deal as “a structural response to Mali’s energy crisis” – strengthening infrastructure, transferring skills and cutting costly fuel imports.
Anatomy of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
The nuclear agreements are the culmination of a diplomatic process that began with Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed in October 2023. The formal intergovernmental agreements were finalized in June 2025, first with Burkina Faso on June 19 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and then with Mali around June 23 during a visit to Moscow by its transitional president, Colonel Assimi GoĂŻta.
Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom, is the central entity managing the deals, offering a comprehensive "turnkey" solution that covers the entire lifecycle of a nuclear program. This integrated model is particularly attractive to newcomer nations lacking indigenous capacity. The scope of cooperation is exceptionally broad and includes :
Infrastructure Development: Assisting in the creation of national nuclear infrastructure in line with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommendations.
Reactor Construction: The design and construction of nuclear power plants and research reactors.
Full Fuel Cycle Services: A critical component that includes the supply of fresh nuclear fuel and the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.
Training and Safety: Building local human capital and establishing robust regulatory frameworks for nuclear and radiation safety.
Non-Power Applications: Extending the use of nuclear technology to sectors like medicine, agriculture, and water desalination.
These nuclear accords are embedded in a larger strategy of mutual investment. For example, Russia has been invited to develop Mali’s lithium deposits and has secured mining deals in the region (Burkina granted Russia’s Nordgold a license on a new ~20.22 ton gold deposit). Such “resource for technology” deals deepen long-term ties: Mali plans its first Russian assisted lithium production within ~2 years, and Rosatom’s subsidiary Novawind is already building a $217 million solar plant near Bamako to boost Mali’s output ~10%. These projects supplement the nuclear agenda and create multi-generational economic linkages.
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES): A Regional Nuclear Bloc
The near-simultaneous signing of the agreements was a coordinated act by the Alliance of Sahel States. The joint pursuit of nuclear technology serves as a high-profile, unifying flagship project for the confederation, designed to cement its internal cohesion and project collective sovereignty.
The AES was established in September 2023 as a mutual defense pact between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger after their suspension from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It has since evolved with ambitions for deep political and economic integration, including a common market and currency. The nuclear program acts as a practical catalyst for this agenda. In AES forums, leaders stress shared sovereignty and pooled resources. Notably, Niger – Africa’s third largest uranium producer – is expected to join this nuclear push under AES auspices. Analysts note that Niger produces about 5% of the world’s mined uranium (2,020 metric tons in 2022) and is moving to open its mines to new partners. A truly regional fuel cycle could emerge: Niger supplies uranium, Burkina and Mali host reactors, all under Rosatom’s technology. As one analyst observes: the AES’s collective energy policy “necessitates harmonized efforts in regulation, grid management and security,” driving new institutions across borders.
Burkina Faso's Energy Minister, Yacouba Zabré Gouba, confirmed the joint approach with Russia, stating that “the two countries have joined forces, and demonstrated their willingness to work together on collaboration, on cooperation, so that the electronuclear program becomes a reality". The AES is positioned to create a vertically integrated regional nuclear fuel cycle—from Nigerien mines to Burkinabe and Malian reactors—under Russian technological stewardship.
Geopolitical Underpinnings: The Pivot from Paris to Moscow
The Sahel’s growing partnership with Russia in the nuclear energy sector is closely tied to a broader realignment in international relations, particularly a shift away from traditional Western alliances. For nearly a decade, French-led military missions such as Operations Serval and Barkhane were active in the region, aiming to address security challenges. Despite these efforts, the security landscape remained complex, prompting local leaders and communities to explore alternative strategies. These operations and the French politics in the region created a strong resentment from the Sahel population against France, therefore, Russia is taking advantage of the situation to replace the vacancy left by France.
In recent years, transitions in leadership—Mali (2020/21), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023)—have ushered in a new political chapter. These governments have taken a more assertive approach to shaping their national policies, including reevaluating foreign partnerships. This included demand for the withdrawal of French military forces and a move toward building a more autonomous regional security framework.
Russia moved swiftly into this strategic vacuum, deploying its state-controlled Africa Corps (a rebranded Wagner Group) as the new primary security partner. Moscow's strategy combines this "hard power" security guarantee with "soft power" diplomacy, framing its engagement as a partnership of equals that respects sovereignty—a message that resonates with AES leaders. The nuclear agreements are the crown jewel of this approach, presenting Russia as a provider of transformative technology for development, a stark contrast to the West's perceived focus on military intervention and conditional aid. This integrated strategy creates a powerful symbiosis: the Africa Corps provides regime security, while the nuclear deal legitimizes the Russian presence as part of a comprehensive development partnership.
Africa's Continental Nuclear Renaissance
The Sahel agreements are part of a broader, continent-wide trend. Across Africa, nations are looking to nuclear energy to address severe energy poverty and meet the development goals of the African Union's Agenda 2063. According to projections made by Nuclear Business Platform (NBP), Africa will witness 15 GW of nuclear capacity by 2035.
The continent's nuclear landscape is varied. South Africa has operated the Koeberg nuclear plant since 1984, Egypt is constructing a large 4.8 GW plant at El Dabaa with Rosatom's help, set to begin full operation by 2030. Other countries like Ghana, Kenya, and Uganda are in advanced planning stages, working closely with the IAEA and engaging a diverse range of international vendors. A larger group, including Nigeria and Rwanda, is exploring options, with strong interest in Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).
This reveals two competing models for nuclear development in Africa. One is a slow, methodical, multi-partner approach guided by IAEA milestones, as seen in Kenya and Ghana. The other is the fast-tracked, single-vendor, geopolitically driven model now being pursued by the AES.
Toward Energy Security and Development
The promises of this partnership are vast. In Burkina Faso and Mali, adding nuclear baseload could relieve chronic power cuts, enable industry (mining, agro processing, manufacturing) and electrify hospitals and schools. Cheaper, reliable electricity would also free foreign currency now spent on imported diesel fuel (Burkina imports much of its fuel). Experts project each 1 GW reactor could supply electricity for roughly one million homes. In the Sahel’s fast-growing cities, even a single reactor would be transformative. All told, the targeted programs could yield gigawatts of new generation over the next decade – a leap from today’s situation (Burkina’s grid meets only ~20% of demand). Moreover, the technology transfer includes human capital. Rosatom plans extensive training programs: for example, Rosatom already educates thousands of African engineers annually. The Malian accord explicitly calls for staff training and “the preparation and retraining of specialists” in nuclear science. Over time, the hope is to develop local expertise in reactor operation, maintenance and nuclear research. This knowledge base is a critical multiplier: it spawns new sectors (medical isotopes, scientific research) and contributes to a skilled workforce, aligning with the Sahel bloc’s development goals.
Finally, these deals solidify a broader security development strategy. Russia’s entry (via its Africa Corps/Wagner) originally addressed immediate security vacuums as former French forces withdrew. The nuclear partnership adds a “soft-power” dimension: it portrays Russia as an ally supplying cutting-edge technology and infrastructure. A Rosatom-trained regulator or a Russian-built physics lab institutionalizes the partnership. For the Sahel regimes, it also creates leverage and alternatives to Western aid. Already, the Malian agreement comes bundled with new trade and scientific commissions, and Burkina’s alliance with Russia is mirrored by Chinese and Turkish investments, all promising modernization.
Strategic Challenges and Feasibility
While the political commitment to nuclear energy in the Sahel is strong, translating that vision into a working program involves navigating several complex and long-term considerations:
Financial Viability: Nuclear power plants are immensely expensive, with costs running into the tens of billions of dollars. While Russia can offer attractive state loans, this creates significant long-term sovereign debt and locks the AES states into a deep financial dependency on Moscow. A recent move by the World Bank to lift its ban on nuclear financing could introduce competition, but the AES's current alignment makes the Russian package their only viable path.
Technical and Infrastructural Readiness: The existing electrical grids in the Sahel are relatively underdeveloped and fragmented. A single nuclear plant should not exceed 10-15% of a grid's capacity to ensure stability, making large reactors unfeasible without massive grid modernization. Smaller, more flexible SMRs are a more plausible option, but the technology is still nascent. Furthermore, the region suffers from a critical shortage of qualified nuclear engineers and technicians.
Regulatory Foundations: A key pillar of any nuclear program is a strong, independent regulatory authority. Building such a framework—aligned with international safety standards and best practices—is essential and typically requires more than a decade of sustained effort and expertise.
Despite the optimism, nuclear power in the Sahel faces hurdles. Hence, while the vision is bold and forward-looking, turning it into reality will require patient, coordinated, and well-resourced planning on multiple fronts. Crucially, international agencies like the IAEA will remain involved. The IAEA has begun supporting AES members in nuclear education and safety. For instance, IAEA Director Grossi’s March 2025 visit to Niger highlighted cooperation on medical and research uses of nuclear technology, even as he underscored safety and continuity amid political change. Most importantly, Sahel nations should carefully assess all the parameters and possibilities as a nuclear power program is a 100 year long journey which could either change favorably the faith of these countries or negatively impact them to being trapped in dependence vis-a-vis Russia.
Way Ahead
In summary, the Russia–Burkina Faso–Mali nuclear partnership is a bold gambit toward a new energy era in the Sahel. It reflects both technological ambition and geopolitical realignment. If successfully implemented, it would mark the most significant expansion of nuclear power in Africa since the 1980s, potentially bringing reliable electricity to tens of millions and catalyzing economic growth. As Mali’s leader put it, the cooperative pact is “innovative” – opening “broad opportunities” by enhancing energy autonomy and industrial development. The path ahead is complex and will require sustained investment and expertise, but the stakes are high. This is a test of whether the Sahel’s long standing aspiration for electrification and sovereignty can find realization through peaceful nuclear energy – and whether other global powers will respond with constructive alternatives to support the region’s advancement.
