Beyond BOO: New Commercial Openings in Türkiye’s Nuclear Sector

Türkiye’s nuclear strategy is often summarised in a single phrase: Build–Own–Operate. The model, implemented at the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant under a 2010 intergovernmental agreement with Rosatom, remains globally distinctive. It insulated Ankara from upfront capital exposure estimated between USD 20–25 billion, while transferring responsibility for financing, construction, ownership, and long-term operation to the Russian side.

For many international suppliers, that structure appeared to close the door. If one entity finances, builds, owns, fuels, and operates a 4.8 GW nuclear facility, where is the commercial entry point?

Yet Türkiye’s declared target of reaching 20 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2050 fundamentally alters that calculation. Akkuyu was an entry mechanism. The broader market is still being defined.

Akkuyu: A Closed Model or a Strategic Baseline?

Akkuyu is the world’s first large-scale nuclear project executed under a pure BOO model. It anchored Türkiye’s entry into nuclear power without exposing the national treasury to massive capital risk. However, it also created a perception challenge, namely that ownership is centralised, fuel supply is integrated and long-term operation is contractually embedded.

However, no nuclear plant exists in isolation. Grid integration, cybersecurity, digital optimisation, environmental systems, supply-chain localisation, and long-term performance enhancement require broader ecosystems. BOO secures the asset. It does not eliminate the need for layered participation over a sixty-year operating horizon. That distinction is critical for international firms evaluating Türkiye.

The Second and Third Plant Shift

Ankara has already signalled that Akkuyu will not be replicated mechanically. Negotiations for the second and third nuclear power plants, at Sinop and Thrace, are advancing under a competitive, multi-vendor framework explicitly designed to reflect lessons learned from the first project.

The proposed Sinop Nuclear Power Plant, targeting 4.8 GW of capacity, represents the clearest departure. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has confirmed that a trilateral cooperation model involving the United States and South Korea is under active consideration. In practical terms, that introduces Generation III+ technologies, including South Korea’s APR1400 and U.S.-origin reactor designs, into structured commercial evaluation.

This is not simply a reactor competition. Türkiye has made clear that future projects will be judged on strategic breadth. Financing conditions, fuel cycle cooperation, localisation depth, and enforceable technology transfer mechanisms now sit alongside technical performance in evaluation criteria.

Thrace and the Multi-Vector Marketplace

Parallel to Sinop, the proposed 5.6 GW Thrace Nuclear Power Plant widens the competitive field further. China’s CAP1400 technology, advanced by SPIC, has entered discussions, adding a major Asian contender to the mix.

With U.S., South Korean, Chinese, and potentially European players in consideration across future projects, Türkiye has effectively engineered a vendor-diversified marketplace. That diversity enhances Ankara’s negotiating leverage and strengthens its ability to demand industrial engagement beyond what was achieved under Akkuyu’s BOO structure.

For international suppliers, this diversification has two implications. First, Türkiye is not locked into a single technological ecosystem. Second, competitive positioning today influences credibility tomorrow. Engagement in advisory services, component manufacturing partnerships, regulatory cooperation, and workforce development can shape long-term alignment ahead of final vendor selection.

Beyond Reactor Supply

Even where reactor vendors dominate headlines, nuclear value chains are far broader.

Instrumentation and control upgrades, grid stabilisation technologies, digital twin optimisation, cybersecurity architecture, environmental monitoring systems, and long-term maintenance services remain commercially viable segments. Türkiye’s expanding nuclear footprint will inevitably require continuous performance enhancement, outage services, and lifecycle support.

BOO centralises ownership. It does not eliminate the recurring economics of maintenance and technological refresh over decades of operation. Companies able to position themselves as complementary rather than competitive actors may find durable entry points.

The SMR Inflection

While large reactors anchor baseload goals, Türkiye’s most forward-looking development lies in small modular reactors. SMRs have transitioned from exploratory dialogue to a formal national objective, with policymakers confirming a dedicated target of 5 GW of SMR capacity.

Unlike large-scale projects, SMRs offer modular deployment, industrial co-location potential, and diversified ownership structures. They also introduce flexibility in financing models, potentially enabling broader participation from export credit agencies and development banks.

Formal discussions are underway with SMR technology holders from the United States, Canada, and France. Engagement is supported by export finance instruments, including frameworks associated with U.S. EXIM Bank, enhancing bankability and signalling external confidence in Türkiye’s regulatory trajectory.

This is commercially significant. SMRs lower entry thresholds for suppliers in engineering services, component manufacturing, digital systems, and balance-of-plant technologies. They create room for industrial integration that may not be as accessible under a centralised BOO framework.

Institutional Depth: The Nuclear Technopark

Perhaps the most strategic long-term development is the establishment of a Nuclear Technopark. Conceived as a hub for research, innovation, and talent development, it signals that Türkiye’s plan extends beyond plant acquisition.

The Technopark is not framed as a short-term localisation instrument. It is positioned as a structural capability platform designed to cultivate domestic expertise across nuclear engineering, safety systems, and advanced technology research.

For international firms, this creates partnership pathways in R&D collaboration, joint ventures, and advanced component manufacturing. It also suggests that Ankara views nuclear power as an industrial transformation vehicle rather than merely an energy security solution.

A Layered Market, Not a Closed One

Türkiye’s nuclear trajectory is too often viewed solely through Akkuyu. Yet the goal to reach 20 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2050 significantly broadens the commercial landscape.

Akkuyu delivered speed and financial insulation. Sinop and Thrace will introduce competitive leverage. SMRs bring flexibility and diversification. The Nuclear Technopark anchors long-term industrial capability. Together, they form a layered and evolving market architecture.

For international suppliers, the issue is no longer whether the BOO model restricts participation, but how engagement aligns with Türkiye’s priorities: financing innovation, technology transfer, and meaningful localisation.

That trajectory will gain sharper commercial definition through forums such as the 3rd edition of Türkiye Nuclear Business Platform (TNBP) 2026, taking place 26–27 August in Ankara, where policymakers, investors, and vendors are expected to refine investment frameworks and partnership pathways.

In a global nuclear environment where new-build markets are limited and politically complex, Türkiye stands out not as a closed system, but as a market transitioning from singular execution to competitive scale. Those who recognise the shift early will find that “beyond BOO” is not a rhetorical device; it is the next commercial chapter.