Türkiye’s Nuclear Market After Akkuyu: A 20 GW Opportunity for Global Vendors

Türkiye is no longer a peripheral nuclear market defined by a single flagship project. It is steadily evolving into one of the most strategically consequential nuclear expansion stories of the coming decades, not because of what has already been built, but because of how deliberately the next phase is being structured.

With a declared target to reach 20 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2050, Ankara is laying the foundations for a multi-decade procurement, construction, and technology partnership cycle that extends well beyond the Russian-built Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. What distinguishes Türkiye’s approach is not just scale, but optionality: a conscious move toward diversified vendors, competitive procurement models, technology transfer requirements, and parallel development of both large reactors and small modular reactors (SMRs).

For global nuclear vendors, EPC contractors, fuel suppliers, financiers, and technology developers, Türkiye is becoming a market that must be understood not as a single-project opportunity, but as a systemic nuclear platform with regional, industrial, and geopolitical relevance.

From Single-Project Entry to Portfolio Strategy

Türkiye’s entry into nuclear power began with Akkuyu, a project that remains globally unique in its structure. Signed under a 2010 intergovernmental agreement with Russia, the 4.8 GW Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant is the world’s first large-scale nuclear project implemented under a pure Build–Own–Operate (BOO) model. Rosatom assumed full responsibility for financing, construction, ownership, and long-term operation, insulating the Turkish treasury from upfront capital exposure estimated between USD 20–25 billion.

The project has already generated measurable domestic economic impact. More than USD 11 billion has been injected into the Turkish economy, with construction employment peaking at over 25,000 workers, roughly 80 percent of whom are Turkish nationals. Beyond direct employment, Akkuyu catalysed the emergence of local suppliers, service providers, and a nascent nuclear workforce — a foundational but intentionally limited form of industrial participation.

Yet Akkuyu was never intended to be the template for Türkiye’s entire nuclear future. Its strategic function was to establish nuclear electricity generation, regulatory capability, and operational experience. The next phase, which is now unfolding, is where Türkiye’s broader goals become clear.

A Competitive Reset: Sinop and Thrace

By 2025, Türkiye’s nuclear strategy entered a decisively different phase. Rather than extending the BOO model, Ankara began advancing negotiations for its second and third nuclear power plants — at Sinop and Thrace — under a competitive, multi-vendor framework designed to reb herald lessons learned from Akkuyu.

The proposed Sinop Nuclear Power Plant, with a targeted capacity of 4.8 GW, has become the focal point of this shift. Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar confirmed that a trilateral cooperation model involving the United States and South Korea is under active consideration. This structure would introduce Generation III+ technologies, including South Korea’s APR1400 and U.S.-origin reactor designs, into direct commercial competition.

Crucially, this is not a technology-only contest. Türkiye has made it clear that future nuclear projects will be evaluated on a broader strategic basis: financing terms, fuel cycle cooperation, localization commitments, and enforceable technology transfer mechanisms are now core criteria.

This direction was reinforced by the Strategic Civil Nuclear Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding signed with the United States in September 2025. The agreement covers technology transfer, joint investment, workforce development, and fuel cycle collaboration, and aligns closely with the principles underpinning a future Section 123 Agreement. Importantly, it spans both large reactors and SMRs, signalling that Türkiye views nuclear development as an integrated ecosystem rather than a series of isolated builds.

Parallel to Sinop, the proposed 5.6 GW Thrace Nuclear Power Plant, involving China’s CAP1400 technology under SPIC, further widens the competitive landscape. With U.S., South Korean, Chinese, and potentially European players in the frame, Türkiye has effectively created a vendor-diversified marketplace that gives the government significant leverage to demand deeper industrial engagement than previously achieved.

SMRs: From Concept to Quantified Market

While large reactors anchor Türkiye’s baseload ambitions, the country’s most forward-looking nuclear move is unfolding in the SMR segment. In 2025, SMRs transitioned from exploratory discussions to a formal national objective, with policymakers confirming a dedicated target of 5 GW of SMR capacity.

This is a meaningful distinction. SMRs are not being treated as an adjunct to large reactors, but as a separate market category designed to serve industrial clusters, data centres, remote regions, and energy-intensive facilities where grid expansion may be inefficient or uneconomic. The positioning reflects a sophisticated understanding of how nuclear can integrate into Türkiye’s broader decarbonization and industrial competitiveness agenda.

International engagement has accelerated accordingly. Formal discussions are underway with SMR technology holders from the United States, Canada, and France, supported by export finance instruments such as U.S. EXIM Bank frameworks. These mechanisms enhance bankability while signalling confidence in Türkiye’s regulatory and policy trajectory.

What differentiates Türkiye from many early SMR adopters, however, is its aim to move beyond deployment toward manufacturing and export participation.

Building a Nuclear Industrial Base

The establishment of a Nuclear Technopark marks a pivotal institutional step. Conceived as a hub for research, innovation, and talent development, the Technopark is intended to anchor long-term domestic capabilities rather than short-term localisation targets.

Engagements with companies such as Rolls-Royce and Westinghouse align with this vision. The message to global vendors is clear: Türkiye is not seeking turnkey suppliers alone, but partners willing to participate in joint ventures, component manufacturing, and regional supply chains. With proximity to Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia, Türkiye offers vendors a potential export platform — particularly for SMR components and services — that few emerging nuclear markets can match.

This industrial logic also feeds back into large reactor procurement. By maintaining multiple vendor pathways across Sinop and Thrace, Türkiye is structurally positioned to negotiate stronger technology transfer and workforce development terms than were achievable under the Akkuyu BOO model.

Why Vendors Are Watching Closely

For global nuclear vendors, Türkiye’s appeal lies in a rare combination of attributes: scale, policy clarity, geopolitical balancing, and procurement sophistication. Equally important is Türkiye’s evolving regulatory and institutional maturity. The shift from a single-vendor BOO framework to competitive tenders anchored in international cooperation agreements reflects growing confidence — and rising expectations — on the Turkish side.

The commercial implications are significant. Vendors able to offer flexible financing, credible localisation strategies, and long-term partnership models are likely to find Türkiye receptive. Those reliant on rigid, single-project delivery models may find the market increasingly selective.

Beyond Akkuyu, Toward a Nuclear Platform

Akkuyu remains a foundational milestone, but it is no longer the defining feature of Türkiye’s nuclear trajectory. The real story lies beyond it: a diversified pipeline of large reactors, a quantified and policy-backed SMR market, and a clear ambition to embed nuclear technology within Türkiye’s industrial and manufacturing ecosystem. This evolution marks a transition from deployment toward participation — and from dependence toward partnership.

That momentum will be tested, refined, and increasingly internationalised through platforms such as the 3rd Türkiye Nuclear Business Platform (TNBP) 2026, scheduled for 26–27 August in Ankara. The high-level gathering is expected to bring together policymakers, investors, global vendors, and regional stakeholders to align investment frameworks, secure long-term partnerships, and clarify procurement pathways. For industry players, it represents more than a conference — it is an early signal of how Türkiye intends to structure its next phase of nuclear growth.

For global nuclear players, Türkiye now represents more than a construction opportunity. It is a proving ground for how emerging nuclear markets can evolve into structured, competitive, and strategically aligned platforms. In that sense, Türkiye matters not only because it is building nuclear power — but because of how deliberately, and commercially, it is choosing to do so.