Vietnam’s Nuclear Comeback: A $22 Billion Strategic Energy Pivot

Vietnam is moving from nuclear hesitation to nuclear acceleration. Nearly a decade after shelving its first nuclear power project on economic grounds, Hanoi has reactivated the program with a level of political alignment, legislative clarity, and administrative urgency that signals more than policy reconsideration. With an estimated $22 billion investment attached to the revival of the Ninh Thuan 1 and 2 nuclear power plants, Vietnam is positioning itself as the most consequential nuclear re-entry market in Southeast Asia.

For international reactor vendors, EPC contractors, fuel cycle companies, and export credit agencies, the key question is no longer whether Vietnam will discuss nuclear energy, but whether it is transitioning into a structured procurement cycle.

Demand Pressure and Decarbonization Imperatives

Vietnam’s macroeconomic trajectory underpins the nuclear revival. The government is targeting economic growth above 8 % this year, with ambitions for double-digit expansion in the following years. Electricity demand is projected to grow at 12–14 % annually, requiring generation capacity to triple by 2030 and expand sevenfold by 2050. At the same time, Vietnam has committed to achieving Net Zero Emissions by 2050, which implies a structural reduction in coal dependency.

This dual pressure—rapid industrial expansion and decarbonization—has forced policymakers to reconsider firm, low-carbon baseload options. While renewables and LNG are expanding, they alone cannot provide the long-term stability required for a grid supporting heavy industry, manufacturing exports, and urbanisation. Nuclear energy is now being repositioned as a strategic complement rather than a controversial alternative.

From Cancellation to Legislative Reset

Vietnam’s original nuclear program dates back to 2009, when the government approved construction of its first plant in Ninh Thuan Province using Russia’s VVER-1200 reactor technology. The project was suspended in 2016 due to fiscal constraints and public debt concerns.

The reversal began in November 2024, when the National Assembly approved restarting the nuclear program. Momentum accelerated in 2025. In February, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh instructed Vietnam Electricity (EVN) and PetroVietnam (PVN) to immediately advance the construction of two nuclear power plants in Ninh Thuan, with a target completion by 2030. Commissioning is projected as early as 2031 and no later than 2035.

This executive push was reinforced legislatively. On June 27, 2025, the National Assembly passed an amended Atomic Energy Law with near-unanimous approval. Effective January 1, 2026, the new law replaces the 2008 framework and introduces comprehensive lifecycle regulation of nuclear facilities, from site survey and design to operation and decommissioning, in line with IAEA standards. The reform formally classifies nuclear energy as a strategic and green power source and strengthens the role of the Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS) as an independent regulator.

The speed and coordination of these actions suggest that the nuclear restart is institutionally anchored rather than symbolic.

The $22 Billion Core: Ninh Thuan 1 and 2

The immediate commercial opportunity centres on two plants in Ninh Thuan, now administratively part of Khanh Hoa Province. The total projected investment is approximately $22 billion, equivalent to roughly 5 % of Vietnam’s GDP.

EVN has been appointed investor for Ninh Thuan 1, located in Phuoc Dinh commune, while PVN will oversee Ninh Thuan 2 in Vinh Hai commune. Under the revised Power Development Plan VIII (PDP8), approved in April 2025, the two plants are expected to deliver 4,000 to 6,400 MW of nuclear capacity between 2030 and 2035. Earlier scenarios envisioned two units of 1,200 MW at each site, with potential acceleration under a high-capacity pathway.

Beyond these initial units, PDP8 outlines the addition of roughly 8,000 MW of nuclear capacity by 2050, with further expansion dependent on demand growth. The Ministry of Industry and Trade has identified nuclear development potential of 25–30 GW in the South-Central region, 10 GW in the Central region, and 4–5 GW in the North Central region. While long-term projections remain aspirational, they establish a geographic and planning framework for multi-unit development.

Vendor Landscape and Geopolitical Balance

Vietnam and Russia have finalised negotiations and agreed on a draft intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in building the Ninh Thuan 1 Nuclear Power Plant. The two countries have also signed an Interdepartmental Roadmap for Nuclear Technology Development through 2030 includes cooperation on a nuclear science and technology centre, workforce training, and research reactor engagement.

South Korea has positioned itself through broader energy cooperation and workforce training agreements, including collaboration between Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and PVN. France, during President Emmanuel Macron’s May 2025 visit, pledged a €500 million concessional loan under the Just Energy Transition Partnership framework, covering renewables, hydrogen, and nuclear-related initiatives. Expanding its international technical partnerships, the Vietnam Atomic Energy Commission (VAEC) and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) have also signed an agreement to enhance the exchange of technical information in the nuclear energy field, further broadening Vietnam’s institutional and technological engagement with established nuclear nations.

Vietnam’s diplomatic posture suggests a strategy of diversified engagement rather than exclusive alignment. Vendor competitiveness will likely depend on financing strength, technology maturity, localisation commitments, and political risk-sharing capacity.

SMRs and Strategic Optionality

Alongside large reactors, Vietnam has signalled interest in small modular reactors. Estimated investment ranges from $7,000 to $12,000 per MW, translating to approximately $2.1 to $3.6 billion for a 300 MW plant. With projected construction periods of two to three years—compared to five to ten years for conventional plants—SMRs offer potential flexibility.

However, SMRs remain a secondary pathway. Geological suitability, waste management solutions, and regulatory adaptation would still be required. In the near term, large-scale reactors at Ninh Thuan form the commercial core, while SMRs represent optionality aligned with longer-term grid diversification.

Financing and Execution Risk

The scale of the program relative to Vietnam’s GDP underscores financing sensitivity. At roughly 5 % of national output, the Ninh Thuan program will likely depend on structured state support combined with export credit mechanisms or vendor-backed financing models. The involvement of EVN and PVN as state-owned investors reduces counterparty uncertainty but does not eliminate fiscal exposure.

Execution risks remain. Aggressive commissioning targets, resettlement logistics, grid integration, and transmission expansion will test administrative capacity. Yet the integration of nuclear into PDP8, combined with legal modernisation and centralised oversight, suggests that Vietnam is attempting to de-risk implementation systematically.

A Regional Turning Point

Vietnam’s nuclear comeback is unfolding within a wider Southeast Asian energy transition. Having signed electricity export agreements with Singapore and Malaysia, the country aims to export 5,000–10,000 MW by 2035 and sustain 10,000 MW through 2050. While renewables will underpin much of this trade, nuclear baseload could significantly enhance reliability and long-term supply security.

If Ninh Thuan reaches financial closure and proceeds on schedule, Vietnam will shift from a cancelled entrant to a credible nuclear builder—potentially becoming the first Southeast Asian state this decade to restart large-scale nuclear construction. For international vendors, Vietnam now represents more than policy rhetoric. The $22 billion program is legislatively anchored, politically accelerated, and moving toward defined procurement milestones, even if not yet fully banked.

That trajectory will be further shaped and internationalised through platforms such as the 11th Asia Nuclear Business Platform (ANBP) 2026, scheduled for 3–5 November in Hanoi, where policymakers, investors, and global vendors are expected to align financing frameworks and clarify partnership pathways.

In a global market with limited new-build openings, Vietnam’s re-entry stands out. The next 18 to 24 months—driven by intergovernmental agreements, financing structures, final investment decisions, and intensified regional engagement—will determine whether this comeback solidifies into Southeast Asia’s next major nuclear build cycle.