Recalibrating Türkiye’s Nuclear Strategy: From Akkuyu to 2050

Türkiye’s nuclear energy programme has entered a decisive phase, guided by a long-term roadmap to reach 20 GW of installed nuclear capacity by 2050. Achieving this scale will require more than reactor deployment alone; it will depend on how ownership, financing, and risk are structured across successive projects. The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant marked Türkiye’s entry into nuclear power through an unprecedented foreign-owned and operated framework, enabling rapid capacity addition while insulating the public balance sheet from upfront costs. As Akkuyu approaches commissioning, attention has increasingly shifted toward how future projects—at Sinop, in Thrace, and through small modular reactors (SMRs), will be structured to support this 2050 target. Examining these projects in sequence offers insight into how Türkiye is recalibrating its nuclear ownership strategy as it moves from initial entry to long-term system expansion.

The Build–Own–Operate Experiment: The Akkuyu Milestone

Türkiye’s first foray into nuclear energy, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in Mersin, represents the world’s first nuclear project implemented under a pure BOO model. Established through the 2010 Intergovernmental Agreement with Russia, the project placed full responsibility for financing, design, construction, ownership, and operation on Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear corporation, for the plant’s entire 60-year operational lifespan. For Türkiye, Akkuyu was not merely an infrastructure project; it was a strategic shortcut into nuclear power, allowing the country to add large-scale baseload capacity without assuming the immediate financial and construction risks traditionally associated with nuclear development.

Financial and Economic Architecture of Akkuyu

The BOO framework adopted for Akkuyu was specifically designed to shield the Turkish treasury from the upfront burden of a project valued between $20 billion and $25 billion. In exchange, Türkiye agreed to a long-term Power Purchase Agreement that guarantees the sale of electricity at a weighted average price of 12.35 cents per kilowatt-hour for the first 15 years of operation of each unit. While this tariff level has been subject to scrutiny, it reflects a broader risk-transfer mechanism inherent to the BOO model. Costs related to decommissioning, radioactive waste management, and long-term operational liabilities—often retained by host governments under EPC arrangements—are internalized by the project owner.

By late 2025, Akkuyu had entered a phase of what can be described as operational validation. Unit 1 moved beyond construction uncertainty and into commissioning preparations, marking a critical psychological and financial inflection point for the project. This transition has been reinforced by the recent injection of approximately $9 billion in additional financing from Russia, confirmed by Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar, intended to support project execution through 2026 and 2027 and enable first power by late 2026. The continued capital commitment underscores Rosatom’s determination to bring the BOO experiment to completion despite geopolitical and financial headwinds.

Business Implications and Investor Confidence

From an investment perspective, Akkuyu’s progression has altered the project’s risk profile in meaningful ways. As construction risks give way to operational readiness, cost projections stabilize, creating conditions more conducive to secondary investment. Rosatom has reportedly explored selling up to a 49 % stake in Akkuyu Nükleer A.Ş. to investors from China, India, the Middle East, and Türkiye. Although Western sanctions have introduced hesitation among certain investor groups, the successful commissioning of the first unit is widely expected to serve as a proof-of-concept for the BOO model’s applicability in emerging nuclear markets.

Economically, Akkuyu has already generated tangible domestic impact. Since its inception, the project has injected more than $11 billion into the Turkish economy, supporting a workforce that peaked at over 25,000 during construction, with Turkish citizens comprising roughly 80 % of total employment. Beyond direct jobs, the project has stimulated a broader industrial ecosystem. According to Rosatom estimates, each direct job at Akkuyu generates up to ten additional positions across logistics, manufacturing, engineering services, and local supply chains, creating what can be described as a self-sustaining “living economy” around the site.

The Limits of BOO and the Search for Strategic Balance

Despite these achievements, the BOO model has also highlighted its structural limitations. Ownership and operational control remain firmly with the foreign vendor, while Türkiye’s influence over pricing flexibility, fuel strategy, and long-term operational decisions is inherently constrained. Indigenous nuclear capability development progresses, but at a slower and more controlled pace than under EPC-led national programmes. These realities have increasingly shaped Ankara’s reassessment of how future nuclear projects should be structured.

The Shift Toward Hybrid and Joint Venture Models: Sinop and Beyond

Where Türkiye truly stands today is in a phase of strategic transition. Akkuyu delivered speed, certainty, and nuclear status, but it is no longer viewed as a universal template. The government has signalled that future projects will likely adopt hybrid or joint venture models that blend state participation, shared ownership, and diversified technology sourcing. This evolution reflects a desire to retain financial discipline while gradually increasing national control and industrial participation.

The “Three-Way Model” for the Sinop Nuclear Power Plant

The proposed Sinop Nuclear Power Plant on the Black Sea coast has emerged as the primary testing ground for this new approach. Following a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States in September 2025, Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar outlined the possibility of a “three-way model” involving Türkiye, South Korea, and the United States. This framework aims to distribute risk and expertise across complementary strengths.

Under this structure, sovereign participation would be ensured through Türkiye Nükleer Enerji A.Ş. (TÜNAŞ), positioning the Turkish state as an active equity stakeholder rather than a passive power purchaser. Technological leadership would likely be provided by South Korea’s KEPCO, which has submitted bids for four APR-1400 reactors and brings a strong record of on-time nuclear delivery. Strategic financing and intellectual property access could be supported by US involvement, potentially through Westinghouse-linked technologies or SMR partnerships, alongside financial backing from the US EXIM Bank, which has already expressed readiness to support nuclear projects in Türkiye.

A final decision on Sinop is expected in 2026, with Ankara weighing whether a joint bid or a single main contractor best serves Türkiye’s long-term interests in cost efficiency, technology transfer, and operational sovereignty.

Thrace and the Multilateral Vendor Strategy

The planned nuclear site in the Thrace region further illustrates Türkiye’s increasingly multilateral strategy. Ongoing discussions with China’s State Power Investment Corporation for a multi-unit plant using CAP1400 technology highlight Ankara’s willingness to engage all major nuclear suppliers simultaneously. By maintaining parallel negotiations with Russia, the United States, South Korea, and China, Türkiye is deliberately fostering a competitive vendor environment. This approach reduces the risk of technological lock-in and strengthens the government’s bargaining position on localization rates, financing structures, and long-term cooperation terms.

Small Modular Reactors and the Corporate Nuclear Model

Beyond large conventional reactors, SMRs are emerging as a distinct pillar of Türkiye’s nuclear vision. The government has set a target of 5 GW of SMR capacity by 2050, viewing these systems not as state megaprojects but as flexible, corporate-driven assets. SMRs align closely with Türkiye’s industrial strategy, offering applications in energy-intensive manufacturing zones, desalination, and hydrogen production.

Unlike Akkuyu’s state-to-state framework, SMR deployment is expected to involve greater private sector leadership. Turkish firms are gradually shifting from component suppliers to project developers, exemplified by reports that Baykar has begun work on a 40-megawatt SMR unit. Lower capital requirements and modular deployment make SMRs more accessible to private power producers and joint ventures with international technology leaders such as Westinghouse and Rolls-Royce, opening a new pathway for indigenous capability building.

Moving Ahead

Türkiye’s nuclear trajectory is no longer defined by a single project or a single partner. Akkuyu demonstrated that large-scale nuclear deployment is possible under a foreign-financed and operated structure, delivering capacity and economic activity while limiting immediate fiscal exposure. At the same time, it has clarified the boundaries of control and flexibility inherent in such arrangements. The emerging approaches at Sinop and Thrace, alongside the growing interest in SMRs, suggest a deliberate shift toward greater risk sharing, diversified partnerships, and increased domestic participation. Rather than pursuing a sudden transformation, Türkiye appears to be recalibrating its nuclear strategy incrementally—using experience gained at Akkuyu to negotiate more balanced ownership and governance structures for the next phase of its nuclear programme.